Articles Posted in Construction Accident

In THOME v. BENCHMARK MAIN TRANSIT ASSOCIATES, LLC, 4th Dept. July 8, 2011, 2011 N.Y. Slip 5884, The Court denied the plaintiff construction worker’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was standing on a scissor lift and, when he repositioned the scissor lift to perform his work, one of its wheels entered a hole in the floor and the scissor lift tipped over, causing plaintiff to fall and sustain injury. In denying the motion the Court held;

“We agree, however, with the further contention of defendants that they raised a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. In opposition to the motion, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiff was aware that holes had been cut into the concrete floor of the building in which he was working and that, on the morning of his accident, plaintiff had been specifically directed not to operate the scissor lift in the area where the holes had been cut. Further, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiff drove the raised lift into that area while looking at the ceiling rather than where the lift was going. Consequently, “[u]nlike those situations in which a safety device fails for no apparent reason, thereby raising the presumption that the device did not provide proper protection within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1), here there is a question of fact [concerning] whether the injured plaintiff’s fall [resulted from] his own misuse of the safety device and whether such conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries” (Bahrman v Holtsville Fire Dist., 270 AD2d 438, 439).”

In a dissent Justice Peradotto voted to affirm the lower court’s granting of summary judgment stating;

In Losito v Manlyn Dev. Group, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 05463, Second Department, June 21, 2011, the plaintiff was required to jump through some hoops but finally prevailed on his cause of action claiming a violation of Section 240(1) of The New York Labor Law.

On January 16, 2009 The lower court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Thereafter following a jury verdict for defendants and entry of judgment on same, The Second Department, on April 19, 2011, reversed the judgment, reinstated the 240(1) cause of action and granted plaintiff’s original motion on his 240(1) cause of action. Based on the facts as set forth in the opinion it is difficult to understand why the motion was denied in the first place. The Court held as follows;

“The plaintiff, on his motion for summary judgment on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), against the defendants Manlyn Development Group, Inc., and FB of Long Island, LLC (hereinafter together the respondents), established, prima facie, that the A-frame ladder on which he was standing was defective and collapsed, causing his injuries (see Monioudis v City of New York, 82 AD3d 945; Zhu Wei Shi v Jun Lan Zhang, 76 AD3d 558, 559; Sozzi v Gramercy Realty Co. No. 2, 304 AD2d 555, 556).

In KARCZ v. KLEWIN BUILDING COMPANY, INC.,et. al., 4th Department, June 10, 2011, The Court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff on his 240(1) claim. The plaintiff had lifted a truss overhead onto the aerial platform of a scissor lift. The truss fell on him causing him to suffer injury. In affirming The Court held;

“The truss fell and struck plaintiff because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Jock v Landmark Healthcare Facilities, LLC, 62 AD3d 1070, 1071-1072; Ullman v Musall, 306 AD2d 813). Thus, “the harm [to plaintiff] flow[ed] directly from the application of the force of gravity” (Runner v NewYork Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 604). We reject defendants’contention that plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Rather, those actions, insofar as plaintiff may have moved toward the falling truss in an attempt to prevent it fromfalling, raise “at most, an issue of comparative negligence,” which is not an available defense under section 240 (1) (Dean v City of Utica,75 AD3d 1130, 1131).”

For those of you in The 4th Department The Court held that under the circumstances of this case the court rejected defendants’ contention that Labor Law vicarious liability provisions did not apply because plaintiff sustained the injury on an Indian reservation, i.e., that of the Seneca Nation.

In Nascimento v Bridgehampton Constr. Corp., New York Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2011, The Court dealt with the oft presented question as to whether a sub-contractor was a statutory agent of the general contractor for purposes of liability pursuant to New York Labor Law Sections 240(1) and 241(6). The facts of the case may be found by clicking on the decision above. What is interesting about this case is that it presents an excellent review of the law regarding this much litigated area which the Court discussed as follows:

“Initially, we reject plaintiff’s broad assertion; the law does not hold that all subcontractors in the “chain of command” are necessarily as liable as the general contractor. Rather, as a subcontractor rather than the general contractor, Bayview may be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) only if it had the authority to supervise and control the work giving rise to the obligations imposed by these statutes, which would render it the general contractor’s statutory agent (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1981]; Murphy v Herbert Constr. Co., 297 AD2d 503 [2002]; Vieira v Tishman Constr. Corp., 255 AD2d 235 [1998]). To be treated as a statutory agent, the subcontractor must have been “delegated the supervision and control either over the specific work area involved or the work which [gave] rise to the injury” (Headen v Progressive Painting Corp., 160 AD2d 319, 320 [1990]). If the subcontractor’s area of authority is over a different portion of the work or a different area than the one in which the plaintiff was injured, there can be no liability under this theory (see Sabato v New York Life Ins. Co., 259 AD2d 535 [1999]; Headen, 160 AD2d at 319).

Subcontractors have been held to be the statutory agents of general contractors in situations in which provisions of the subcontracts explicitly granted supervisory authority (see Weber v Baccarat, Inc., 70 AD3d 487, 488 [2010]; Nephew v Klewin Bldg. Co., 21 AD3d 1419, 1421 [2005]), and those in which evidence showed that the subcontractors actually exercised supervisory authority (see Everitt v Nozkowski, 285 AD2d 442, 444 [2001]). Additionally, evidence that a subcontractor delegated the requisite supervision and control to another subcontractor has been cited as forming part of the proof that the first subcontractor formerly possessed that authority, and may justify imposing Labor Law liability on the first subcontractor as a statutory agent of the general contractor (see Weber v Baccarat, 70 AD3d at 488; Everitt v Nozkowski, 285 AD2d at 444). “

By Anthony H. Gair,

In Arnaud v. 140 Edgecomb LLC, et al., decided on April 14, 2011, The New York Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the denial of summary judgment in a construction accident case on a construction worker’s New York Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

Plaintiff was working at a building undergoing renovation. Plaintiff and a co-worker were moving wood planks from the fourth floor to the second floor, by use of a pulley and ropes. While plaintiff was on the second floor, with his arms outstretched through a window to grab the wood as it was lowered, he was suddenly struck by a plank, which caused injury to his wrist and fingers. While we believe the decision was correct it seems the Courts are continuing to have trouble interpreting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc. The Court stated as follows;

By Anthony H. Gair

In Gasques v. State of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 869, 910 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Ct. Apps. 2010), , a two paragraph decision with regard to Section 240(1) the Court stated as follows:

“Claimant Wanderlei Gasques was injured while repainting the inside of a leg of the Kosciuszko Bridge, using a ‘spider scaffold.’ His hand was injured when it became caught between the scaffold and the leg of the bridge, while the scaffold was ascending.

With respect to claimants’ Labor Law §240(1) cause of action, the parties agree that Gasques’s hand was crushed because the scaffold continued to move, under the impetus of one of its motors, while his hand was trapped between an external motor control on the scaffold and the steel of the bridge. This injury was not the direct consequence of the application of the force of gravity to an object or person (see Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 604, 922 N.E.2d 865, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279 [2009]; Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500-501, 618 N.E.2d 82, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1993]). Therefore claimants’ Labor Law §240(1) claim was properly dismissed.”

On first reading this decision one might conclude that in future cases a defendant might argue that there is no Section 240(1) liability if;

1. A motorized hoist or scaffold is involved.

2. Gravity is not involved if the hoist or scaffold is going up.

3. No 240(1) liability because no elevation related differential.

If one watches the oral argument on The New York Court of Appeals web site one could reasonably conclude that the basis of the decision was that the scaffold was going up since The Justices asked numerous questions as to how gravity could be involved since the scaffold was going up.

It is submitted that the basis for the Court’s decision had nothing to do with the scaffold being motorized or the fact that it was going up but the fact that there was no elevation related differential involved. This seems clear since the Court cited Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, supra.
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