Gair, Gair, Conason, Rubinowitz, Bloom, Hershenhorn, Steigman & Mackauf is a New York Plaintiff's personal injury law firm specializing in automobile accidents, construction accidents, medical malpractice, products liability, police misconduct and all types of New York personal injury litigation.

Articles Posted in Ladder Accidents

Published on:

By

By Anthony H. Gair;

In Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1, 935 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Ct. Apps. 2011) The New York Court of Appeals rejected The Same Level Rule first enunciated by The Court in Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 657 N.E.2d 1318, 634 N.Y.S.2d 35 [1995]. The Rule precluded recovery under Labor Law §240(1) where a worker sustained an injury caused by a falling object whose base stood at the same level as the worker.

In order to understand the holding in Wilinski, one must consider what was transpiring at The Court at the time of the decision. There was an obvious philosophical difference with regard to the reach of 240(1). Judge Piggot led a faction consisting of him and Judges Graffeo and Read who interpreted 240(1) more restrictively and a faction led by Judge Lippman together with Judges Ciparick and Jones who interpreted 240(1) more liberally with Judge Smith as the swing vote. With the untimely death of Judge Jones and the retirement of Judge Ciparck at the end of the year it will be an interesting 2013 regarding The Court’s holdings in 240(1) cases. The majority opinion was written by Judge Ciparick who also wrote the opinion in Misseritti. She was joined by Judges Lippman, Jones and Smith.

In Wilinski The plaintiff and co-workers were demolishing brick walls at a warehouse. Previous demolition of the ceiling and floor above had left two vertical plumbing pipes unsecured. The pipes rose from the floor on which plaintiff was working approximately ten feet. Debris from a nearby wall that was being demolished hit the pipes causing them to fall over both of which struck the plaintiff who was 5’6″ tall. The Court stated the pipes thus fell approximately four feet. In rejecting the same level rule Judge Ciparick writing for the majority stated:

“Some New York courts have interpreted our decision in Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 657 N.E.2d 1318, 634 N.Y.S.2d 35 [1995] to preclude recovery under Labor Law §240(1) where a worker sustains an injury caused by a falling object whose base stands at the same level as the worker. We reject that interpretation and hold that such a circumstance does not categorically bar the worker from recovery under section 240(1). However, in this case, an issue of fact exists as to whether the worker’s injury resulted from the lack of a statutorily prescribed protective device.”

In explaining why, in its opinion lower courts had been misinterpreting Misseritti, Judge Ciparick stated:

“In Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assocs., (96 NY2d 259, 750 N.E.2d 1085, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37 [2001]), though we noted that section 240(1) applies to both ‘falling worker’ and ‘falling object’ cases, we declined to impose liability where a plaintiff was cut by a piece of glass that fell from a nearby window pane (id. at 267). We concluded that ‘[t]his was not a situation where a hoisting or securing device of the kind enumerated in the statute would have been necessary or even expected’ and that the absence of such a device ‘did not cause the falling glass here’ (id. at 268-269). Therefore, the accident was outside the scope of section 240(1) (see id.).

In Misseritti, we applied a similar rationale. The plaintiff’s decedent in that case sustained severe injuries, leading to his eventual death, when a completed concrete firewall collapsed on top of him (see 86 NY2d at 489). Before the wall collapsed, ‘decedent and his co-worker had just dismantled the scaffolding used to erect the completed firewall and . . .[m]asons had not yet vertically braced the wall with the . . . planks it had on the work site’ (id. at 491). We held that section 240(1) did not apply to those facts, as the firewall did not collapse due to a failure to provide a protective device contemplated by the statute (see id.). We determined that, in fact, the kind of braces referred to in section 240(1) are ‘those used to support elevated work sites not braces designed to shore up or lend support to a ‘completed structure’ (id.). Thus the firewall’s collapse, though tragic in consequences, was simply ‘the type of peril a construction worker usually encounters on the job site.’ (id.).
Continue reading →

Published on:

By

In Torres v Our Townhouse, LLC, 2012 NY Slip Op 00418 decided on January 24, 2012 The New York Appellate Division, First Department in a one paragraph decision reversed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action and granted the motion. The Court held;

“Plaintiff was injured when he fell to the ground while descending from a 12-foot-high sidewalk bridge without the use of a ladder or scaffold or any other safety device. Defendants contend that he was provided with a ladder and that his own decision to climb down a nearby tree instead of using the ladder was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. However, the record fails to support this contention. Even if defendants’ evidence suggested that there might have been a ladder in the chassis under the truck at the work site, no evidence was presented that plaintiff knew where the ladder was or that he knew he was expected to use it and for no good reason chose not to do so (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88 [2010]; Auriemma v Biltmore Theatre, LLC, 82 AD3d 1, 11 [2011]). “

Published on:

By

In MALONEY v.J.W. PFEIL & COMPANY, INC.,et al., Appellate Division, 3rd Department, decided May 19, 2011, plaintiff, while standing on the top cap of a six-foot ladder installing sheetrock on an overhead soffit, fell and sustained injury. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action and defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Given the facts as set forth by the Court it is difficult to understand why plaintiff brought the motion. According to The Court plaintiff testified as follows;

“In his deposition testimony, plaintiff admitted knowing that there were other safety devices in other locations in the building better suited for the type of work he was about to perform and that he had routinely used these devices while working on this project. He acknowledged that a baker’s scaffold was in his immediate work area and, at the time of his fall, was being used by n associate working with him. Plaintiff also acknowledged that the stepladder he was using at the time of his fall, while not defective, was not tall enough for the work he was performing, and he admitted knowing that it of his fall, was being used by an associate working with him.

Plaintiff also acknowledged that the stepladder he was using at the time of his fall, while not defective, was not tall enough for the work he was performing, and he admitted knowing that it contained a written warning never to stand on the top cap of the ladder when using it. Given this proof, we find that defendants made a prima facie showing that Labor Law § 240 (1) was not violated (see id. at 917; see also Jock v Landmark Healthcare Facilities, LLC, 62 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2009]), shifting the burden to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to this claim.

Continue reading →
Published on:

By

Our partner Howard Hershenhorn recently settled this case in New York Supreme Court, New York County. The case involved the wrongful death of a 38 year old construction worker who fell from a ladder at 80 Centre street in Manhattan. The construction worker was in the process of demolishing a chimney when the 6 foot A-Frame ladder upon which he was standing shifted causing him to fall 25 feet. He sustained fatal injuries including a brain injury and other internal injuries from which he later died . On behalf of the Estate we argued that the defendants violated sections 240(1) and 241(6) of The New York Labor law and that these violations by the Owner and General contractor were the proximate cause of the accident and the worker’s death. The defense argued that the worker was the sole proximate cause of the accident in that he failed to use available safety devices.

The New York Construction Accident Lawyers at Gair, Gair, Conason, Rubinowitz, Bloom, Hershenhorn, Steigman & Mackauf have years of experience representing construction workers who have suffered injury and /or death in construction accidents in New York.

Published on:

By

In Fox v H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P;et.al., 2011 NY Slip Op 03205, decided April 19, 2011, The Appellate Division, Second Department rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff was enagaed in routine maintenance and thus Section 240(1) was not applicable.

The facts as set forth by The Court were as follows;

“The plaintiff was employed by the fourth-party defendant Garrity Electric, Inc. (hereinafter Garrity), as a mechanic performing general electrical contracting work. Pursuant to an agreement between the defendant third-party plaintiff, H & M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. (hereinafter H & M), and the third-party defendant/fourth party plaintiff Maintenance, Etc., LLC (hereinafter Maintenance), which provides retail companies with vendors for construction services, Garrity was hired to replace bulbs and ballasts/transformers in 78 overhead light fixtures, located approximately 12 feet above the floor, in a retail store leased by H & M. Garrity had done business with H & M since 2000, performing electrical work for which it was paid the sum of $30,000 to $50,000 per year. Garrity furnished a team of “seven or eight” workers, including the plaintiff, which was led by a team foreman, to perform the subject work in the H & M store. The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell from a ladder while engaged in this work. The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.”

Continue reading →
Published on:

By

In Parente v 277 Park Ave. LLC, decided June 25, 2009, The New York Appellate Division, First Department granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment under Section 240 of The New York State Labor Law.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell off a ladder he had placed on a desktop in an office leased by defendant Chase, while inspecting a malfunctioning booster fan over the desk. In rejecting the defendants’ argument that the work was only routine maintenance The Court held:

Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners, contractors and their agents for injuries to workers engaged in the repairing of a building or structure that results from falls from ladders or other similar devices that do not provide the intended protection against such falls (see Orellano v 29 E. 37th St. Realty Corp., 292 AD2d 289, 290 [2002]). It does not, however, apply to routine maintenance that is not performed in the context of construction or renovation. Replacement of parts that routinely wear out is considered maintenance, outside the purview of this section (see Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 882 [2003]). Where something has gone awry, however, requiring repair, § 240(1) is applicable (see Caraciolo v 800 Second Ave. Condominium, 294 AD2d 200, 201-202 [2002]; Franco v Jemal, 280 AD2d 409 [2001]).

Continue reading →
Published on:

By

In Campuzano v. Board of Education of the City of New York, JJ Lyons Associates, Inc; Decided on August 12, 2008, The First Department reversed the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) and granted the motion. The facts as set forth in The opinion of The Court were as follows;

“Plaintiff Joaquin Campuzano and a coworker, while performing asbestos abatement work, were removing a heavy duct from a ceiling by cutting it with an acetylene torch. They started this work on a scaffold, but Campuzano determined it was dangerous to work that way, and decided instead to set up a ladder adjacent to the scaffold. While Campuzano was standing on the ladder and holding the hoses for the torch, a portion of the duct fell, hitting him and the ladder and knocking him to the ground.”

In granting plaintiffs’240(1) Motion The Court held;

Continue reading →
Published on:

By

In Morales v. D & A Food Service, et.al; June 25th 2008, The Court Of Appeals in reversing The First Depatrment’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Section 240(1) claim held;

“The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, defendant Santomero’s motion for summary judgment denied, plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against defendant Santomero granted and certified question answered in the negative.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff’s work constituted an alteration within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]). In light of our recent decision in Sanatass v Consolidated Inv. Co., Inc. (10 NY3d 333 [2008]), defendant’s contention that he lacks a sufficient nexus with plaintiff to support liability under section 240 (1) is without merit. Since plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his section 240 (1) claim and defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition thereto, plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability. ”

Continue reading →
  1. Pages:
  3. 1
  4. 2
Badges
Super Lawyers Best Lawyers Martindale-Hubbell
SEE NEW JERSEY DISCLAIMER PAGE- AWARD METHODOLOGY